

Mission

¶1 The primary mission of the statewide public defender system is to provide effective assistance of counsel to indigent persons accused of crime and other persons in civil cases who are entitled by law to the assistance of counsel at public expense. *Mont. Code Ann. §47-1-102(1)*. This mission, arising out of fundamental principles on which our constitutions of the United States and the State of Montana are founded, was the obligation of the State of Montana long before the enactment of the Montana Public Defender Act in 2005.

¶2 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” The implementation of this Sixth Amendment right traveled an arduous course before reaching *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963), where the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that state courts are required under the Sixth Amendment to provide counsel in felony cases for defendants who are financially unable to retain private attorneys. *Argersinger v. Hamlin*, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972), held that, without a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether petty, misdemeanor or felony, unless represented by counsel at trial.

¶3 The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that in proceedings for determining delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or counsel will be appointed to represent the child if they cannot afford counsel. *In re Gault*, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). In Montana, minors have the same right to counsel as adults. *Mont. Const. Art. II, §15* (1972).

¶4 It is sufficient here to say that the right to counsel attaches at the “critical stages” of the criminal justice process. *Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas*, 554 U.S. 191, 212^{FN16} (2008), noted that “critical stages” are defined as “... proceedings between an individual and agents of the State (whether ‘formal or informal, in court or out,’ see *United States v. Wade*, 388 U.S. 218, 226, ... (1967)) that amount to ‘trial-like confrontations,’ at which counsel would help the accused ‘in coping with legal problems or ... meeting his adversary,’ *United States v. Ash*, 413 U.S. 300, 312-313 (1973) ...” Citing the “simple reality” that 97% of federal convictions and 94% of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas, there is no longer doubt that the plea bargaining process is a critical stage during which the accused is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. *Missouri v. Frye*, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1406-07 (2012); *Lafler v. Cooper*, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012). As footnoted,¹ a critical stage may happen earlier in a case but without doubt a defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer is a critical stage that triggers the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. *Rothgery*, 554 U.S. at 213.

¹Other critical stages where the right to counsel attaches include post-arrest interrogation, *Brewer v. Williams*, 430 U.S. 387, 399-401 (1977); *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 479-81 (1966); line-ups, *United States v. Wade*, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967); other identification procedures, e.g., one person “showup,” *Moore v. Illinois*, 434 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1977); initial appearance, *Michigan v. Jackson*, 475 U.S. 625, 629^{FN3} (1986); arraignments, *Hamilton v. Alabama*, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961); preliminary hearing, *Coleman v. Alabama*, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970); plea negotiations, *Brady v. United States*, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) and *McMann v. Richardson*, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970); and direct appeals, *Douglas v. California*, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963).

¶5 A defendant is guaranteed the right to assistance of counsel in criminal cases by our *Mont. Const. Art. II, §17* and §24 (1972). *State v. Rardon*, 305 Mont. 78, 78-79 (2001); *State v. Colt*, 255 Mont. 399, 403 (1992), citing *State v. Enright*, 233 Mont. 225, 228 (1988). Due process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and *Art. II, §17*, of the Montana Constitution requires the assistance of counsel in situations other than criminal cases where “fundamental liberty interests” are at stake. The Montana Supreme Court has cited U.S. Supreme Court cases in discussions about fundamental fairness calling for the assistance of an attorney so the individual can meaningfully participate and the procedure is fundamentally fair.²

¶6 Situations in which the right to the assistance of an attorney was deemed essential to fundamental fairness were codified before the statewide public defender system was created. Those situations are now catalogued in *Mont. Code Ann. §47-1-104(4)(b)*.

¶7 Reasonably effective assistance is the standard for performance any time counsel appears on behalf of an accused, *i.e.*, the representation must come within an objective standard of reasonableness. *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984).³ Montana follows

²For examples, see *In re A.F.-C.*, 307 Mont. 358, 368-70 (2001), citing *Lassiter v. Department of Social Services*, 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 & 32-33 (1981); *In re A.R.A.*, 277 Mont. 66, 70-71 (1996), citing *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); *In re A.S.A.*, 258 Mont. 194, 198 (1993), and *Matter of R.B.*, 217 Mont. 99, 102-03 (1985), citing *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (a natural parent's right to the care and custody of his or her child is a “fundamental liberty interest” that must be protected by fundamentally fair procedures). Also see Professor Mary Helen McNeal’s law review article, *Toward a “Civil Gideon” under the Montana Constitution: Parental Rights as the Starting Point*, 66 Mont. L. Rev. 81 (Winter 2005), for an extensive examination of *Mont. Const. Art. II, §16* (administration of justice), *Art. II, §4* (dignity and equal protection), *Art. II, §17* (due process), and *Art. II, §34* (unenumerated rights) clauses as cornerstones for the development of a “civil Gideon” in Montana.

³*Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 688-89: “... Representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. See *Cuyler v. Sullivan*, *supra.*, 446 U.S. [335] at 346, 90 S.Ct. at 1717 [(1980)]. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. See *Powell v. Alabama*, 287 U.S. [45] at 68-69, 53 S.Ct. at 63-64 [(1932)].

“These basic duties neither exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance. In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, *e.g.*, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) (“The Defense Function”), are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. (*Citation omitted*). Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. ...”

the *Strickland* objective standard of reasonableness when evaluating ineffective assistance claims in criminal cases. *Whitlow v. State*, 343 Mont. 90, 93-94 (2008). For the “civil cases” listed in *Mont. Code Ann. §47-1-104(4)*, standards used to evaluate claims of legal malpractice and the *Strickland* test simply do not go far enough to protect the liberty interests of individuals who may or may not have broken any law but who may indefinitely bear a social stigma. *In re A.S.*, 320 Mont. 268, 273-75 (2004), quoting from *In re Mental Health of K.G.F.*, 306 Mont. 1, 7, ¶33 (2001).

¶8 Providing effective assistance of counsel at critical stages in the types of cases delineated in *Mont. Code Ann. §47-1-104(4)* has not been optional or negotiable for a long time. The enactment of the Montana Public Defender Act in 2005 consolidated the delivery of the assistance of counsel in those cases through the statewide public defender system rather than through a hodgepodge of programs.